ABSTRACT A digital signature is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that is used heavily in information society for guaranteeing the authenticity of digital information. Incremental signature, introduced by Bellare, Goldreich, and Goldwasser (CRYPTO'94), is a digital signature that enables a signer to sign messages quickly when these messages are similar. It is extremely useful for authenticating, e.g., big data since there are huge messages in big data and many of them only have small differences. In this paper, we propose an incremental signature scheme from lattices. Our scheme is proven secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the standard model, assuming the k-small integer solutions problem on lattices is intractable. We also conduct experiments to evaluate its efficiency. The experimental results demonstrate that our incremental signature scheme is effective for signing a series of messages with many overlaps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signature is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that is used heavily in our daily life to guarantee the authenticity of electronic documents. For instance, when we visit a web site, we should first verify whether the web site is authentic. To do this, we will check the validity of its digital certificate. The certificate, produced by some trusted authority, is essentially a signature on a document containing the web site information.
Customarily, if we want to get signatures corresponding to multiple messages, we have to sign them individually and independently. In other words, the time to sign k messages should be k × T , where T is the time to sign a single message. We observe that this method is unsatisfactory in some realistic scenarios, e.g., authenticating big data and softwares. Because in these scenarios there are huge messages and/or each message is very long, the signature-generation procedure would be time consuming. Notice that in the above scenarios the messages to be signed are usually similar. For example, we may constantly update a software such as fixing some bugs to improve its quality, so the updated software often has many overlaps with the previous one. Hence, to accelerate the signature-generation procedure, we can use incremental signature schemes which could produce
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signatures quickly when the messages to be signed have small differences.
A. INCREMENTAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
The notion of incremental cryptography is initiated by Bellare et al. [4] for the sake of efficiency. To show the specific advantages of incremental cryptography, Bellare et al. [4] also present an incremental hash family and an incremental signature scheme in their seminal work. Take digital signature as an example. The idea behind incremental signatures is that once a signer has got a signature σ on a message µ, then the signer needs not to recompute the signature σ on an updated message µ of µ from scratch; Instead he can extract σ from (µ, σ, µ ) within a time that should ideally be proportional to the amount of modification of µ. Therefore, the time to sign k similar messages using incremental signature schemes would be shorter than that of using conventional signature schemes.
Stimulated by real-world applications, incremental cryptography has received great attention over the past few years in cryptography community. Following Bellare et al. ' s [4] pioneering work, many researchers have also presented serval new incremental cryptographic schemes such as hash functions [6] , [12] , signatures [5] , [25] , encryption [5] , [10] , [28] , program obfuscation [3] , [18] and many others [2] , [17] . The security of these schemes is mostly based on traditional hardness assumptions, which however would succumb to attacks by quantum computers.
B. LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
As a promising alternative to traditional cryptosystems, lattice-based cryptography has also attracted considerable attention from cryptography researchers. Traditional cryptosystems mostly rely on the hardness of factoring or computing discrete logarithms for their security. Unfortunately, both of the problems are potty for quantum computers [30] , resulting in traditional cryptosystems may not be secure in the post-quantum era. To resist attacks by quantum computers, building cryptosystems on hard lattice problems come into being, because these underlying problems are conjectured to be hard even for quantum algorithms. In addition, lattice-based cryptography also has some other appealing aspects, such as it enjoys strong worst-case/average-case security reductions and usually involves only simple operations. Thanks to these advantages, a great effort has been made to design cryptographic schemes on lattices and many constructions of lattice-based signatures have already emerged, e.g., [7] - [9] , [11] , [14] , [20] , [22] - [24] , [26] .
Generally speaking, there are two approaches to construct signatures upon hard lattice problems. One follows the 'hash-and-sign' methodology [13] with a special pre-image sampleable function (e.g. [7] - [9] , [11] , [20] , [26] ), and the other is based on the Fiat-Shamir framework [16] using the so-called rejection sampling technique (e.g. [14] , [22] - [24] ). The lattice signatures built on the rejection sampling technique are proven to be secure only in the random oracle model, hence they may be insecure when implemented with concrete hash functions. The 'hash-and-sign' lattice signatures could be proven secure without random oracles e.g. [9] , [11] , [26] . However, existing 'hash-and-sign' lattice signatures have one common drawback, i.e. they usually have a lower efficiency than signatures relying on traditional hardness assumptions (see [15] for more details), which may make them impractical for real-life applications.
C. OUR RESULTS
Motivated by current applications and security concerns, in this paper we combine the advantages of incremental signatures with the benefits of lattices and present a specific latticebased incremental signature scheme. We prove the scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the standard model under the k-Small Integer Solutions assumption, which, as shown in [8] , can be reduced to the hardness of standard lattice problems. We also conduct experiments to evaluate the efficiency of our scheme. The experimental results demonstrate that our signature scheme is effective for signing a series of messages with many overlaps. For example, when signing 100 KB messages, our incremental signing algorithm can achieve a time-saving of up to 86.83% over standard (i.e. non-incremental) one. Therefore, we believe that our scheme would work well in, e.g., realizing postquantum secure authentications of big data and softwares.
In a nutshell, our incremental lattice signature scheme adopts the 'hash-and-sign' methodology while is inspired by the incremental signature technique of Bellare et al. [4] . Roughly speaking, Bellare et al. in [4] suggest to get an incremental signature scheme by replacing the hash function used in a secure standard signature scheme with an incremental one. They claimed that the incremental signature schemes simply drawn from this method would be secure under adaptive chosen-message attacks, however we remark that great attention should be paid when designing specific incremental signature schemes using their technique. Actually, we find that the following simple incremental lattice signature scheme obtained directly from their framework is not secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. The signature scheme is built on the well-known 'hash-and-sign' lattice signature scheme of Gentry et al. [20] , and a simple incremental lattice-based hash function invented by Ajtai [1] .
Let's first briefly recall the GPV signature scheme, which is provably secure under adaptive chosen-message attacks. Given integers n, q > 0 and m, d > n log q, and a public matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , the GPV signature on a message v ∈ {0, 1} d is a short vector e ∈ Z m satisfying Ae = H (v) (mod q), where H : {0, 1} d → Z n q is a collision-free hash function. In the light of Bellare et al.'s suggestion, we can get an incremental lattice signature scheme after replacing H with the incremental lattice-based hash function y = Bx (mod q) where B ∈ Z n×d q is random. (The incrementality of the hash function is shown in [6] ). In other words, the resulting incremental lattice signature scheme has public matrices A ∈ Z n×m q , B ∈ Z n×d q , and its signature on a message v ∈ {0, 1} d is a short vector e ∈ Z m such that Ae = Bv (mod q). Suppose now that we have two signatures e 1 , e 2 corresponding to the message v 1 = (0, 1, . . . , 1) and its update v 2 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) respectively, then we can obtain the vector e 2 − e 1 satisfying A(e 2 − e 1 ) = B(v 2 − v 1 ) (mod q). Notice that e 2 − e 1 is also short, so it's a valid signature on the new message (1, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore, we can conclude that the incremental lattice signature scheme cannot resist chosen-message attacks.
To construct a secure incremental lattice-based signature scheme, we employ the idea of Boneh and Freeman [8] , i.e., bounding the length of valid lattice signatures more tightly. Furthermore, we also generalize the k-time signature scheme in [8] to admit larger message spaces and adaptive security.
D. OVERVIEW OF OUR SCHEME
Here we give a sketch of our scheme. Our goal is to make the above incremental lattice signature scheme provably secure. Let the message space be {0, 1} d×w for some positive integers d, w. The public key of our scheme consists of a matrix A ∈ Z n×m pq and w + 1 random matrices C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C w ∈ Z n×d p , where p, q both are prime. Given a message µ ∈ {0, 1} d×w , let v i denote its ith column, i.e., µ = [v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v w ]. We first pick a short r ∈ Z d and set
is essentially a hash of the message µ). Then we calculate a short e ∈ Z m such that Ae = qb · u (mod pq), where b is an integer satisfying qb = 1 (mod p). The signature of µ is (r, u, e). We will use the recent pre-image sampling algorithm of [26] to produce such a vector e, and impose a tighter bound on its length, as done in [8] , for security. Now suppose we need to sign a new message µ that is the same as µ except the jth column v j , then we can calculate its signature incrementally as follows: (1) Pick a short r ∈ Z d and set u = u + C 0 (r − r) + C j (v j − v j ); (2) Output a short e ∈ Z m using the aforementioned sampling algorithm such that Ae = qb·u (mod pq). The signature of µ is (r , u , e ). We can easily check that
is essentially a hash of the message µ ).
After selecting appropriate parameters, the signature for the same message generated using the incremental approach will be indistinguishable from the signature generated using the above first method. However, we remark that the incremental approach is more efficient (for similar messages) than the first one since computing u incrementally will spend less time especially when messages are large (that is, the incremental hashing algorithm is time-saving with respect to the usual one).
To prove security of our scheme in the standard model, we show that an adversary that breaks our scheme could be used to solve either the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem or the k-Small Integer Solutions (k-SIS) problem.
E. RELATED WORK
The SIS problem, raised by Ajtai [1] , is used broadly in lattice-based cryptography as an underlying hardness assumption. Micciancio and Regev [27] have shown that, for appropriate parameters, it's as hard as certain worst-case intractable problems on lattices.
Boneh and Freeman [8] recently propose a variant of SIS called k-SIS and prove k-SIS can be reduced to standard SIS. Based on the result (and a tighter bound on the length of signatures), they construct two lattice signature schemes in [8] , one is a linearly homomorphic signature scheme (in the random oracle model) and the other is a k-time signature scheme (in the standard model). Their k-time signature scheme is proven secure against static attackers (rather than adaptive ones) and can only sign n-bit messages, where n is a security parameter. At the heart of the two signature schemes is a pre-image sampler invented by Gentry et al. [20] and recently improved by Micciancio and Peikert [26] .
There are few incremental signature schemes so far. The first one is presented by Bellare et al. [4] and proven secure under traditional hardness assumptions. Later, Bellare et al. [5] and Micciancio [25] present new incremental signature schemes with enhanced security, while they rely on slightly involved tree structures.
F. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries to be used in this paper. We then present our lattice-based incremental signature scheme and its security proof in Section 3. In Section 4, we conduct a series of experiments to demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme. Finally, Section 5 concludes the whole paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notation: Throughout this paper, the security parameter is n. For a positive integer d, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , d} by [d] and the set of all non-negative integers less than d by Z d . Vectors are in column form, and are written in bold lower-case letters while matrices in bold upper-case letters. We use x t to represent the transpose of x. We denoteÃ as the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of A. We define the largest singular value of A as s 1 (A) = max u Au , where u is a unit vector and · denotes the 2 norm.
We say a function in n is negligible, written negl(n), if it's smaller than all polynomial fractions for large n. We say an event with parameter n happens with overwhelming probability if it happens with probability at least 1−negl(n). We may omit a negligible function when no confusion arises.
For a set S, we use x ← S to indicate that x is drawn uniformly at random from S. 
A. INCREMENTAL SIGNATURE SCHEMES
We first give the formal definitions of incremental signature schemes, which are adapted from [4] . As mentioned before, an incremental signature scheme is a signature scheme that enables a signer to get the signature σ of µ quickly from the message-signature pair (µ, σ ) when µ is an update of µ. Without loss of generality, in this paper we always assume that each message has w blocks and any two contiguous messages such as µ and µ only have one block difference.
Definition 1 (Syntax): An incremental signature scheme consists of four probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms, namely the system setup algorithm Setup, the standard signing algorithm Sign, the incremental signing algorithm IncSig, and the verifying algorithm Verify.
• Setup(n): Given a security parameter n, the algorithm outputs the system public parameter PP and a secret key SK .
• Sign(PP, SK , µ): Given the public parameter PP, the secret key SK and a message µ, the algorithm outputs a signature σ of µ.
• IncSig(PP, SK , µ, σ, µ ): Given the public parameter PP, the secret key SK , a message-signature pair (µ, σ ) and a new message µ , the algorithm outputs an incremental signature σ of µ .
• Verify(PP, µ, σ ): Given the public parameter PP, a message µ and a signature σ , the algorithm outputs 1 with VOLUME 7, 2019 overwhelming probability if σ is a valid signature for message µ; otherwise it outputs 0. Correctness: We require an incremental signature scheme must satisfy the correctness property, that is, for all n and messages µ, µ , if (PP, SK ) = Setup(n), σ = Sign(PP, SK , µ) and σ = IncSig(PP, SK , µ, σ, µ ), then both Verify(PP, µ, σ ) = 1 and Verify(PP, µ , σ ) = 1 must hold with all but negligible probability.
For the security of incremental signature schemes, we allow an adversary A to make both standard and incremental signing queries on any selected messages. Informally, an incremental signature scheme is called secure if any PPT adversary A cannot output a forgery (µ * , σ * ) with a nonnegligible probability such that µ * has never been queried and Verify(PP, µ * , σ * ) = 1. The specific definition of security is as follows.
Definition 2 (Security): We say an incremental signature scheme is secure under adaptive chosen-message attacks if the probability that any PPT adversary A wins the following game is negligible. The game is played between a challenger C and the adversary A.
• Setup: Given a security parameter n, the challenger C runs the algorithm Setup to generate the public parameter PP and a secret key SK . Then C sends PP to the adversary A and initializes ζ = 0.
• Query: The adversary A could query the following two oracles adaptively. Both oracles are controlled by C.
-Sign Oracle: On input a message µ, the challenger C runs the algorithm Sign(PP, SK , µ) → σ and returns σ to A. Then C increases ζ by 1, and stores (µ ζ , σ ζ ) = (µ, σ ). -IncSig Oracle: On input a tuple (i, j, ν), the challenger C first recalls (µ i , σ i ), then runs the algorithm IncSig(PP, SK , µ i , σ i , µ ) → σ and returns σ to A, where i ∈ [ζ ] and µ is an updated message of µ i with the jth block is replaced by ν. Then C increases ζ by 1, and stores (µ ζ , σ ζ ) = (µ , σ ).
• Forgery: When the above procedures end, the adversary A outputs a pair (µ * , σ * ). We say that A wins the game if Verify(PP, µ * , σ * ) = 1 and µ * / ∈ {µ 1 , . . . , µ ζ }.
B. LATTICES
Here we review some backgrounds on lattices. 
We call B a basis of lattice . The dual lattice * generated by the basis B is the set containing all x ∈ R m such that x t ·y ∈ Z for any y ∈ .
This work relies on the following q-ary lattices.
Definition 4:
Given positive integers n, q, and m, a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a syndrome u ∈ Z n q , define:
C. DISCRETE GAUSSIANS
We will heavily use the discrete Gaussian distributions.
Recall that the m-dimensional continuous Gaussian function centered at c ∈ R m with parameter s > 0 is
The discrete Gaussian distribution is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Discrete Gaussian
where ρ s,c ( ) = z∈ ρ s,c (z). For notation convenience, when c = 0, we will abbreviate ρ s,0 and D ,s,0 respectively as ρ s and D ,s .
Micciancio and Regev [27] have introduced a lattice quantity regarding discrete Gaussians called smoothing parameter.
Definition 6 (Smoothing Parameter): Let be a lattice and a real > 0, the soothing parameter η ( ) of is the smallest positive real s such that ρ 1/s ( * \ {0}) ≤ . We recall the following bounds on smoothing parameters. Lemma 1 [20] : Let be an m-dimensional lattice with basis B, and let real > 0. Then we have
In particular, for any function ω( √ log m), there is a negligible (m) such that η ( ) ≤ B · ω( √ log m). With smoothing parameters, we have the following useful facts on discrete Gaussian distributions.
Lemma 2 [20] : Let be an m-dimensional lattice, real ∈ (0, 1) and s > η ( ). Then for any c ∈ R m , we have 1
Lemma 3 [29] : Let be an m-dimensional lattice, c ∈ R m , real > 0 and s ≥ 2η ( ), then for any x ∈ , we have
When < 1/3, the min-entropy of D ,s,c is at least m − 1. Particularly, given a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and x ← D Z m ,s with s ≥ 2η ( ⊥ q (A)), the probability that there exists a new x ∼ D Z m ,s satisfying Ax = Ax is at least 1 − 2 −m+1 .
Lemma 4 [20] : Let n, q, m ≥ 2n log q be positive integers. If s ≥ ω( √ log m) and x ← D Z m ,s , then for all but a 2q −n fraction of all A ∈ Z n×m q , the distribution of y = Ax mod q is statistically close to uniform over Z n q . We need the tighter bounds below proved in [8] to constrain the length of valid lattice signatures.
Lemma 5 [8] :
In our incremental signature scheme, we will set τ = 0.1.
D. HARDNESS ASSUMPTIONS
Our scheme relies on the hardness of the k-SIS problem, which is a variant of the SIS problem raised by Ajtai [1] and formalized in [27] . Let's first recall the definition of SIS problem.
Definition 7 (SIS):
Given integers n, q, m, a random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a real β > 0, the SIS problem is to find a nonzero e ∈ Z m such that e ≤ β and Ae = 0 (mod q).
Micciancio and Regev [27] have proven that for any m, β = poly(n) and prime q ≥ β √ n · ω( √ log n), solving the average-case SIS problem with parameter (q, m, β) is as hard as solving, e.g., the shortest independent vectors problem on lattices in the worst-case.
Boneh and Freeman [8] define the k-SIS problem as follows.
Definition 8 (k-SIS):
For any integer k ≥ 0, the k-SIS problem with parameter (q, m, β, s) is: given integers n, q, m, a real β > 0, a Gaussian parameter s > 0, a random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and k vectors e 1 , . . . , e k ∈ Z m drawn from D ⊥ q (A),s , finding a nonzero vector e ∈ Z m such that 1) e ≤ β, 2) Ae = 0 (mod q), and 3) e / ∈ Q-span({e 1 , . . . , e k }). We can see that when k = 0, the k-SIS problem is the standard SIS problem. Boneh and Freeman [8] 
n) and β = β(k 3/2 + 1)k!(ts) k . Therefore, we know that for small k the k-SIS problem would also be as hard as those well-known intractable lattice problems.
Boneh and Freeman [8] have proven the following lemmas related to the k-SIS problem. They are useful in our security proof.
Lemma 6 [8] : Let p and q be relatively prime integers, m ≥ 2n log q and Gaussian parameter s > p · ω( √ log m). Let 
Lemma 7 [8]:
Suppose m ≥ 2n log q and k · ω( √ log n) < min(s, m 1/4 ), where k is small constant integer and Gaussian parameter s ≥ η ( ⊥ q (A)) for some negligible . Let (A, S) be a k-SIS instance, where A ∈ Z n×m q is uniformly random and S = {e 1 , . . . , e k } with e i ← D ⊥ q (A),s . Then the nonzero vectors in Q-span(S) with length no more than 1.1 · s √ m/2π are ±e i for i ∈ [k] with overwhelming probability.
E. PRIMITIVE MATRICES
The concept of primitive matrix is first put forward by Micciancio and Peikert [26] . Our pre-image sampling algorithm will rely on the primitive matrix G that is generated by the primitive vector g.
For any positive integer q and κ = log q , define
q . Then the primitive matrix G is defined as G = I n ⊗ g t ∈ Z n×nκ q , where ⊗ denotes the tensor product. Let S κ be a basis of the κ-dimensional lattice ⊥ (g t ), then a basis of the lattice ⊥ (G) is S = I n ⊗ S κ ∈ Z nκ×nκ . Let (q 0 , . . . , q κ−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} κ be the binary expansion of q i.e. q = i q i · 2 i , then S κ can be constructed as follows.
The reason of using the primitive matrix is that it is very simple and requires little storage. Moreover, the pre-image sampling algorithm upon it is also very effective.
Theorem 1 [26] : Let integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, κ = log q . There is a primitive matrix G ∈ Z n×nκ q such that: 1) The lattice ⊥ (G) has a basis S ∈ Z nκ×nκ satisfying S ≤ √ 5 and S ≤ max{ √ 5, √ κ}. 2) Both G and S require little storage. According to the above construction, they are sparse, with only O(nκ) nonzero entries. 3) Let Gaussian parameter s ≥ S · ω( √ log n). The preimage sampling for f G (x) = Gx (mod q) is efficient. We now introduce the G-trapdoor of a matrix A. Definition 9 [26] : Let integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, κ = log q , and m ≥ nκ. Let matrices A ∈ Z n×m q , G ∈ Z n×nκ q , and let H ∈ Z n×n q be invertible. A G-trapdoor for A with tag H is a matrix R ∈ Z (m−nκ)×nκ such that A R I = HG. The quality of R is measured by its largest singular value. Lemma 8 [26] : Let integers m ≥ 1, w > 0 and real s > 0. If R is sampled from D Z m×w ,s , then we have s 1 
except with negligible probability. The factor hidden in O is about 1/ √ 2π . With the above facts, Micciancio and Peikert [26] give the following two algorithms for respectively generating a random matrix A along with a G-trapdoor R and sampling small pre-images of f A (x) = Ax (mod q) using R.
Lemma 9: For any integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2,m ≥ 1. Let w = n log q and D Zm ×w ,s be a discrete Gausssian distribution with s ≥ ω( √ log n). There is an efficient algorithm VOLUME 7, 2019 GenTrap(m, w, H) that, givenm, w and an invertible H ∈ Z n×n q , outputs A ∈ Z n×(m+w) q statistically close to uniform and its G-trapdoor R ∼ D Zm ×w ,s (for tag H).
Lemma 10: Let integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2,m ≥ 1, w = n log q and m =m+w. Given A ∈ Z n×m q and its G-trapdoor R ∈ Zm ×w (with tag H ∈ Z n×n q ), then for any u ∈ Z n q and Gaussian parameter s ≥ 7(s 1 (R) 2 + 1) · ω( √ log n), there is an efficient algorithm SampleD (A, R, H, u, s) that outputs e ∈ Z m from a distribution statistically close to D u q (A),s . For simplicity, in the rest of this paper, we always set the above H ∈ Z n×n q as the identity matrix I n ∈ Z n×n , and omit it when no confusion arises.
III. OUR SCHEME
Here we show our lattice-based incremental signature scheme. Table 1 lists some parameters involved in the scheme. 
A. CONSTRUCTION
Our incremental signature scheme works as follows.
• Setup(n): Given a security parameter n, publish the system public parameters: two relatively primes p, q > 2, integers b satisfying qb = 1 (mod p), κ = log pq , and do the following: 1) For i = 0, 1, . . . , w, select matrices C i ← Z n×d p . 2) Run the algorithm GenTrap(m − nκ, nκ) to generate A ∈ Z n×m pq and a G-trapdoor R ∈ Z (m−nκ)×nκ . 3) Output the public key PK = (A, C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C w ) and the secret key SK = R.
• Sign(PK , SK , µ): Given the public key PK , the secret key R and a message µ ×Z n p ×Z m .
• IncSig(PK , SK , µ, σ, µ ): Given the public key PK , the secret key R, a message µ ∈ {0, 1} d×w along with its signature σ = (r, u, e), and an updated message µ = [v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v w ] ∈ {0, 1} d×w of µ such that µ and µ are the same except the jth block, do the following:
• Verify(PK , µ, σ ): Given the public key PK , a message 
B. PARAMETERS AND CORRECTNESS
We first set integers m ≥ 2n log pq and d ≥ 2n log p for security. To generate the secret key R from the algorithm GenTrap, we set the Gaussian parameter involved in it as s R ≥ ω( √ log n) according to Lemma 9. By Lemma 8, we know s 1 
. We then set the Gaussian parameter used in the algorithm SampleD as s ≥ 7(s 1 (R) 2 + 1) · ω( √ log n) by Lemma 10 and lets ≥ 1.1 · wds 2
To make the k-SIS problem underlying our scheme as difficult as certain worst-case lattice problems, we set β >
to guarantee the intractability of the standard SIS problem.
Finally, the correctness of our scheme is verified as below. 
On the other hand, we also know, from Lemmas 10 and 5, that e will satisfy the following conditions with overwhelming probability.
• Ae = qb · u (mod pq),
C. PROOF OF SECURITY
Theorem 2: Our incremental signature scheme is secure under adaptive chosen-message attacks in the standard model, assuming the k-SIS problem is hard.
Proof: Per Definition 2, we will prove that if there exists a polynomial-time adversary A who can break our incremental signature scheme with non-negligible probability after making at most Q 1 standard signing queries and Q 2 incremental signing queries, then we can construct a polynomial-time algorithm B who can either solve the standard SIS problem or the k-SIS problem with probability at least 5 /(8M k ) − negl(n), where k = Q 1 +Q 2 and M > 0 is a real constant (it's valve will be given later). The simulation is as follows.
• Setup: Given a k-SIS instance consisting of a random matrix B ∈ Z n×m q and k vectors e 1 , . . . , e k ← D ⊥ q (B),s , as well as a SIS instance-a random C in Z n×d p , B do:
be the matrix whose ith column is u i for all i ∈ [k]. 2) Pick w matrices D j ∈ Z d×d for j ∈ [w] such that their columns are all sampled independently from
Let E ∈ Z m×k be the matrix whose ith column is e i for all i ∈ [k]. According to Lemma A.3 of [8] , the probability that E has rank less than k is bounded by 2 k−m + negl(n). As m k, we know E is column full rank with overwhelming probability.
5) Choose a random matrix
6) Get A ∈ Z n×m pq (using Chinese remainder theorem) such that A = B (mod q), and
7) Output the public key PK = (A, C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C w ).
• Query: The adversary A could adaptively query both standard signatures and incremental signatures on any messages. It's clear that in our scheme the two kinds of signatures for the same message have the same distribution, so the algorithm B can respond them in the following unified way. Let the ith queried message be
and computes
B finally outputs r i with probability min(1,
for the parameters used in our experiments). The signature returned to A is σ i = (r i , u i , e i ). Lemma 11 shows that the distribution of σ i will be statically close to that of the signatures generated from our real scheme and σ i will be output with probability at least 1/M − negl(n). Thus, in the whole simulation B can respond all A's queries successfully with probability at least 1/M k − negl(n) (it's non-negligible for small k).
• Forgery: When the above process ends, the adversary A outputs a valid signature σ * = (r * , u * , e * ) on a fresh message µ * = [v * 1 , v * 2 , . . . , v * w ] with probability . Here we first show that the above simulation is indistinguishable from our signature scheme.
For the above pubic key PK = (A, C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C w ), we know that A p is statically close to uniform since E is uniform mod p by Lemma 6. Hence, A is also uniformly random. By Lemma 4, we know that all C j = CD j for j ∈ [w] are statistically close to uniform over Z n×d p , yielding the above public key is uniformly random as in our scheme. Now we show that for the same message the signature generated in the above simulation is also indistinguishable from the one produced by our scheme.
For a signature σ = (r, u, e) produced by our scheme on a message µ = [v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v w ], regardless whether σ is standard or not, we know from our construction that r (by Lemma 10) . While in the above simulation, we can see that a signature on the message 
As e i ← D ⊥ q (B),s , Eq. 2 yields Ae i = Be i = 0 (mod q). Combining Eq. 3 with Eq. 1 means
, as in our scheme.
We then show that B can either solve the hard standard SIS problem or the k-SIS problem via A's forgery.
Without loss of generality, we assume µ * = 0. Since σ * = (r * , u * , e * ) is a valid signature of µ * , we know 1) u * = C 0 r * + w i=1 C i v * i and r * ≤ 1.1 ·s
. Lemma 12 shows that r * + w i=1 D i v * i = 0 with probability at least 1/2. Meanwhile, we can easily check that, with all but negligible probability,
. That is, B solves the standard SIS problem with probability about 1/2.
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If e * = 0, then we have Ae * = Be * = 0 (mod q) as per Eq. 2. Below we need further to consider two cases, i.e., whether e * = ±e j for all j ∈ [k]. When it's true, then we know e * / ∈ Q-span({e 1 , . . . , e k }) with overwhelming probability by Lemma 7. Per Definition 8, e * is a solution of the k-SIS problem. Hence, B immediately solves the k-SIS problem with overwhelming probability.
Otherwise, e * = ±e j for some j ∈ [k]. Then we have Ae * = qb · u * = ±Ae j = ±qb · u j (mod pq), which means u * = ±u j (mod p). As a result, we have
And we can also easily check that, with all but negligible probability,
That is, B solves the standard SIS problem with probability about 1/2.
Finally, we show the overall probability that B successfully solves the above SIS and k-SIS problems in the simulation.
Let P 0 denote the overall probability that B successfully solves the above hard problems in the simulation, and let P SIS (resp. P k−SIS ) denote the probability that B outputs a solution of the SIS (resp. k-SIS) problem. Since a prerequisite that B can successfully solve the above hard problems is B can respond all A's queries and A will output a valid forgery, then we know P 0 ≥ (P SIS + P k−SIS )/M k − negl(n). On the other hand, we know that B is able to output a solution of the SIS problem with probability at least 1/2 when e * = 0 as well as e * = 0 ∧ e * = ±e j for some j ∈ [k]. So we have
In addition, we also know that B could output a solution of the k-SIS problem with overwhelming probability in case e * = 0 ∧ e * = ±e j for all j ∈ [k]. Hence, we have P k−SIS ≥ 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/4. Consequently, we have
Since the k-SIS problem can be reduced to the standard SIS problem, our theorem follows.
Lemma 11: The distribution of the signatures generated as in the above simulation is statistically close to that of the signatures produced by our real signature scheme.
Proof: As shown before, the last two components of a signature generated by the above simulation is indistinguishable from their counterparts produced using our real scheme, so we only need to prove that the first components of signatures generated by this two procedures are also indistinguishable. This proof follows directly from [23, Th. 3.4] . Roughly speaking, the theorem states that for any d = O(n), c ∈ Z d satisfying c ≤ T and any reals ≥ T · ω( √ log d), there exists a fixed positive real M such that the distribution of outputting r drawn from D Z d ,s,c with probability 
, we know the final r i produced by the simulation obeys a distribution that is statically close to D Z d ,s (and the simulation will output r i with probability at least 1/M − negl(n)). Note that the distribution of r i generated from our real scheme is D Z d ,s , thus we know the first components of signatures generated by the two different procedures are also indistinguishable.
Lemma 12 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to validate the efficiency of our incremental signature scheme.
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
Our experiments employ the GMP library [21] , and are implemented in C++ 11 and compiled by g++ 5.4.0. We use a PC equipped with a Ubuntu 16.04 LTS system, Intel Core i5-7500 CPU and 16 GB RAM for our experiments. All results represent the mean of 10 trials. We will conduct experiments for n = 128 and n = 256 respectively, and range message sizes from 20 KB to 100 KB. We first fix n, then constantly adjust the values of p, q so that all parameters satisfy the requirements as in Section III-B.
The specific values of some main parameters are given in Table 2 . It is worth noting that when n = 128, we set d = 16384 and w = 50 to get a message of size 100 KB. Then we only change w to 10, 20, 30 and 40 respectively for getting messages of sizes 20 KB, 40 KB, 60 KB and 80 KB. Similarly, when n = 256, we fix d = 24576 and set w to be 7, 14, 20, 27 and 34 for getting messages of sizes (approximately) ranging from 20 KB to 100 KB.
In our experiments, we will set the function ω( √ log n) to be √ ln(2n(1 + 1/ ))/π with = 2 −80 , and the algorithm SampleD will use the improved sampling algorithm of [19] for ⊥ (G). Note that our signing algorithm Sign involves hashing a message and executing the algorithm SampleD, while our incremental signing algorithm IncSign contains incremental hashing a message and executing the algorithm SampleD. To make comparisons more clear, we will signalize the computation times of these substeps. Figure 1 depicts the computation time comparisons between the signing algorithm and the incremental signing algorithm for n = 128, and Figure 2 shows the comparisons for n = 256. From the two figures, we can see that when the message sizes increase, the computation times of signing algorithm grow linearly while the computation times of incremental signing algorithm remain the same. Therefore, the larger the message, the more attractive the incremental signing algorithm. In addition, we can also see that the algorithm SampleD is more efficient than the hashing algorithm (denoted as Hash), whereas the incremental hashing algorithm (denoted as IncHash) is even more efficient than the algorithm SampleD.
B. EVALUATION RESULTS
Specifically, for our experiments, the incremental signing algorithm achieves 56%-86.83% time-savings over the standard one when n = 128, and the time-savings are 41.78%-78.77% when n = 256. Hence, we can conclude that our incremental signing algorithm is effective for signing messages with many overlaps.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a lattice-based incremental signature scheme and demonstrate its effectiveness for signing messages with many overlaps via experiments. We prove that our scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the standard model under the k-SIS assumption.
